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Abstract 
We investigate the fiscal interactions between Italian municipalities over the period 2001-2011, and we find a 
positive horizontal interdependence in spending decisions. Our results are robust to different specifications of the 
spatial neighbors and are confirmed by a natural experiment (earthquake in the Abruzzo region in 2009) that 
creates an exogenous variation in the neighbors’ spending. Furthermore, there is no evidence of yardstick 
competition when we consider political effects, while we do find a negative relationship between spatial interaction 
and the size of the municipality. Thus, we conclude that spillover effects drive the strategic interactions in spending 
decisions. 
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Introduction 
Many studies in the last two decades aimed to assess the existence of spatial effects influencing local 
expenditure decisions. In particular, there is a line of worki, both theoretical and empirical, that 
investigates whether governments make their spending decisions by taking into account the behavior of 
their neighbors. In such a framework, decisions on expenditures would depend not only on the traditional 
determinants of local spending, such as income, grants, socio-demographic and political characteristics 
of municipalities, but also on spending decisions of neighboring municipalities. Indeed, if municipalities 
choose their expenditures/taxes – which can affect the welfare of their neighbors – by maximizing their 
own welfare without taking into account their neighbors’ welfare, they end up into inefficient levels of 
expenditure and/or taxes (Gordon, 1983).  
The existence of strategic interactions between local governments is theoretically explained by several 
models, e.g. yardstick competition, tax and welfare competition, spillover effects, political trend and, 
more recently, knowledge diffusion and social learning. In the yardstick competition model, voters with 
no complete information on the cost of public goods and services compare expenditures and taxes in their 
jurisdiction to those of nearby jurisdictions (Salomon, 1987) and, hence, voters punish the incumbent 
politician if tax rates or spending decisions are not in line with those of their neighbors. Starting from the 
seminal work of Besley and Case (1995) – who show that neighbors’ tax rates impact on the probability 
of re-election for the incumbent in the US states – a substantial body of literature has developed 
documenting and empirically testing yardstick competition (see, among others, Revelli, 2002a; 
Bordignon et al., 2003; Solé-Ollé, 2003; Allers and Elhrost, 2005; Padovano and Petrarca, 2014). The 
second source of spatial interdependence arises in tax competition models. Municipalities face mobile 
tax bases, which depend on both their own tax rate and their neighbors’ tax rate giving rise to tax 
competition (Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Devereux et al., 2008; Rizzo, 2008). In the traditional “spillover” 
model, public expenditures of a municipality may have positive or negative effects beyond its own 
boundary, thus affecting the welfare of residents in neighboring municipalities. As a result, municipalities 
might decide the level of their own expenditure by strategically taking into account the expenditures of 
their neighbors (Case et al 1993; Revelli, 2002b; Revelli, 2003; Baicker, 2005; Solé-Ollé, 2003; Werck 
et al., 2008; Costa et al., 2015). Yet, strategic interactions among local governments can be also explained 
by political interactionsii. This idea is based on the assumption that the local incumbent politician, in 
order to take into account the common ideology, makes her decisions on taxes and expenditure by looking 
only to those neighbors belonging to the same political party (Geys and Vermier, 2008; Santolini, 2009). 
Empirical findings support this hypothesis. In particular, Foucalt et al. (2008), by using a panel dataset 
on French municipalities over the period 1983-2002, show that spending interactions exist between 
municipalities that have the same political affiliation. The same results are confirmed for Spanish 
municipalities by Delgado et al. (2014), while for the Italian case, political ideology is a relevant 
determinant of fiscal interaction only for right-wing and centrist parties (Santolini, 2008)iii. Finally, 
another source of fiscal interaction might be related to knowledge diffusion and social learning. This 
occurs when a local government mimics other local governments that result to be well informed on the 
setting of optimal tax rates and efficient levels of expenditure (Glick, 2014). 
Most of the empirical literature estimates fiscal strategic interactions by considering the tax side of the 
local budget. Indeed, there are only few papers that focus explicitly on public expenditures (Case et al., 
1993; Figlio et al., 1999; Baicker, 2005; Revelli 2002 and 2003, Foucalut et al., 2008 and Costa et al., 
2015) and, among these, only two works deal with the Italian framework (Ermini and Santolini, 2011; 
Bartolini and Santolini, 2012). However, the latter are conducted on a sample of sub-national Italian 
jurisdictions (municipalities belonging to Marche regioniv) and they focus only on current expenditure. 
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, no one has investigated strategic interactions in both current and 
capital expenditure decisions, by using a comprehensive dataset on Italian municipalities.  
In this work, we aim to fill this gap by assessing the existence of spatial effects influencing the spending 
decisions of Italian municipalities and identifying the source of such interdependences. We use 
information on all Italian municipalities (except for those in autonomous regions) over the period 2001-
2011. By employing the Arellano-Bond estimator, we estimate an empirical model where the public 
expenditure in a given municipality depends on the average of their own border municipalities’ 
expenditures and on a set of control variables, including the lagged value of the expenditure. We find a 
positive horizontal interdependence in spending decisions among Italian municipalities. However, some 
political variables turn out to be important determinants of local expenditure. In fact, the election year 
positively affects both total and capital expenditure, implying the presence, among Italian municipalities, 
of a political budget cycle, i.e., strategic incentives to manipulate policy decisions close to the time of 
elections (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). Moreover, the level of expenditure is higher among 
those municipalities where the mayor wins the election with a strong majority. Interestingly, we also find 
that the population size of the municipality negatively affects the impact of neighbors’ expenditure on its 
own expenditure, such that, above a certain level of population, the positive horizontal interdependence 
in the municipal expenditure vanishes. This last finding, together with the not significant interactions 
with political variables (i.e., electoral and pre-electoral years, political power of the mayor and mayors 
that, by law, cannot be re-elected), let us argue that the strategic interaction is due to spillover effects and 
it is not driven by yardstick competition. 
The main contribution of this paper derives from the properties of our dataset. Since it includes all Italian 
municipalities for the period 2001-2011, it allows testing the existence of local spending interactions by 
also controlling for the persistency in local expenditures. Such a feature has been exploited only by few 
papers, including Foucalut at al. (2008); Bartolini and Santolini (2012) and Costa et al. (2015)v. 
Moreover, our study is the first that investigates the source of interactions on capital expenditure for the 
Italian case. The local policy maker uses these investments as a way to attract economic activities, firms 
and households, and hence it is highly likely to observe strategic interactions between municipalities. If 
two municipalities are neighbors and one of them invests in roads, there is also an incentive for the other 
municipality to invest in roads, in this way the residents of both municipalities would have higher benefits 
from road usage.  
Finally, we test the robustness of our results not only by using alternative weighting matrices - as it is 
common in the applied literature of spatial econometrics -  but also by employing a natural experiment 
approach. In particular, we focus on the period 2009-2010, and we consider 49 municipalities of Abruzzo 
region that were hit in 2009 by a dreadful earthquake that caused economic losses of more than 14.7 
billion euros.  We build a dummy variable equals to one for municipalities hit by the earthquake, and 
then we convert it in a measure of the intensity of the earthquake by using the Mercalli-Carcani-Sieberge 
scale. For each municipality we identify the neighbors, and we use the corresponding value of the 
earthquake intensity to instrument the change in the average expenditure of neighboring municipalities 
from 2009 to 2010. The estimates of spatial interactions in municipal expenditure obtained in this 
experimental context confirm those obtained by relying on internal instruments (using the same sample 
of municipalities belonging to Abruzzo region), and so pointing to the existence of interactions in public 
expenditures among local governments.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the following section illustrates the institutional framework; 
the second section discusses the econometric strategy and the third section describes the data. The fourth 
section presents our main results, while robustness tests are shown in the fifth section. Then, in the sixth 
section, we investigate more in depth the source of spatial interaction, by testing yardstick competition 
and spillover hypotheses. Finally, the last section concludes. 
 
 Institutional framework: a brief analysis of Italian municipalities’ spending 
The Italian Constitution defines four administrative government layers: central government, regions, 
provinces and municipalities. While most regions and provinces are ruled by ordinary statutes, some of 
them – the autonomous regions and provinces – are ruled by special statutesvi. Furthermore, Italy counts 
107 provinces, which have recently been reformed by the law 56/2014 that reduced their public 
competences and eliminated the possibility of direct elections of their own representatives. Finally, 
municipalities are the smallest level of jurisdiction and are around 8,000, the average size is around 6,400 
inhabitants and most of them have less than 15,000 inhabitants (approximately 90%). 
Municipalities in Italy are responsible for several public functions, such as social welfare services, 
territorial development, local transport, infant school education, sports and cultural facilities, local police 
services, water delivery, waste disposal as well as most infrastructural spending. According to our data, 
municipalities’ total expenditure accounts, on average, for about 8.7% of all total public expenditures in 
Italy during the period 2001-2011. 
Municipalities’ current expenditure, on average, accounts for 71% of the municipalities’ total 
expenditure, which corresponds to 63 billion euros per year during 2001-2011. Among current 
expenditure, approximately 75% is concentrated on four main functions: Administration and 
Management, Roads & Transport Services, Planning and Environment and Social welfare. The 
remaining 25% of the current expenditure is allocated to the Municipal police, Education, Culture, Sport, 
and Tourism. Finally, a very low amount of resources goes to three functions, Economic development, 
In-house production services and Justice, managed by many medium-sized and small municipalities 
networking with other municipalities. 
Municipalities are also responsible for investments, which are on average 29% of the total expenditure 
in the period 2001-2011. However, it is worth noting that the share of these expenditures sharply 
decreased in the period 2006-2011, switching from 34% to 21% of total expenditures. At the same time, 
the share of current expenditure has increased. Looking at the specific functions, municipalities allocate 
resources for investments mainly to Administration and Management (16.7% of the capital expenditure) 
Roads and Transport Services (26%), Planning and Environment (27.5%) and Education (9%). 
Empirical framework 
Our econometric strategy is based on the estimation of a spatial autoregressive dynamic panel model 
(Anselin et al., 2008), which takes the following form: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺(𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑊𝐺−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,   (1) 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑡 is the per capita expenditure of municipality i in year t, and 𝐺(𝑖𝑡−1) is its one year lagged value. 
𝑊𝐺−𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑡𝑗≠𝑖  is the weighted per capita average expenditure of the neighboring municipalities j 
at time t; ωij are exogenously chosen weights that aggregate the per capita expenditure of neighboring 
municipalities into a single variable WG−i,t. The ωij are normalized so that ∑ ωijj≠i = 1.  𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a matrix 
of demographic, socio-economic and political characteristics of municipality i at time t, and it also 
includes per capita transfers (current, capital or total grants, according to the dependent variable adopted 
in the estimation) from upper tiers of governments (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡). μi is an unobserved municipal specific 
effect, τt is a year specific intercept and εit is a mean zero, normally distributed random error. 
In equation (1), the coefficient β measures the degree of inertia of the municipal expenditure, whereas 
the coefficient γ captures the horizontal interdependence in the municipal expenditure, which is the 
reaction of the expenditure of a given municipality to a one-euro increase in the average expenditure of 
its neighbors. Focusing on the fiscal interaction term, γ, there are three possible cases that are related to 
the degree of complementarity and substitutability in the provision of public goods and/or services: 
i) γ =0:  no horizontal interdependence, namely municipalities do not imitate each other in 
setting local public spending. 
ii) γ< 0: negative horizontal interdependence, that is a one-euro increase in the average 
expenditure of neighboring municipalities leads to a reduction in the municipal expenditure. 
This case holds when public goods/services provided by neighbors’ municipalities are 
substitutes of the municipality’s own goods/services. For example, two swimming pools, one 
located in each municipality, are likely to be substitutes and, hence, there is no incentive for 
a given municipality to increase its expenditure as a response to an increase in neighbors’ 
expenditure. 
iii) γ> 0: positive horizontal interdependence, that is a one-euro increase in the average 
expenditure of neighboring municipalities leads to an increase in the municipal expenditure. 
This case holds when public goods/services provided by neighbors’ municipalities are 
complements of the municipality’s own goods/services. For example, road services provided 
by the two municipalities are likely to be complements and, hence, there might be an incentive 
for a given municipality to increase its expenditure as a response to an increase in neighbors’ 
expenditure. 
Since equation (1) includes endogenous variables, the OLS estimation is inappropriate as it generates 
biased estimates. The average neighboring expenditure, 𝑊𝐺−𝑖𝑡, is endogenous because expenditure 
interactions are symmetric and simultaneous: each municipalities’ behavior affects that of its neighbors 
and it is affected by their behavior in the same way. The lagged dependent variable, 𝐺(𝑖𝑡−1), which is an 
important determinant of the municipal expenditure (Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Larcinese et al., 2013), is 
correlated with the municipality fixed effects in the error term, leading to biased and inconsistent fixed 
effects estimations (Nickell, 1981). The variable 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 is also endogenous, as simultaneously 
decided with municipalities’ expenditures. Thus, we use the system GMM (SYS-GMM) dynamic panel 
estimator (Arellano and Bover,1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). vii 
Data  
The data on Italian municipalities used in our work include a full range of information for the period 
2001-2011 and are organized into two sections: 1) municipality financial data and 2) municipality 
demographic, socio-economic and electoral data, such as population size, age structure, average income 
of inhabitants, election years. We restrict our sample to municipalities located in ordinary statute regions. 
We exclude municipalities that have a specific status of metropolitan areas (law 56/2014)viii, because 
they usually provide a wider range of services compared to other municipalities. Our final sample 
includes 5,564 municipalitiesix, observed from 2001 to 2011, which generates a balanced panel data set 
of 61,204 observations. It is worth noting that all financial variables are expressed in 2011 real per capita 
value. The description and the summary statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are reported in 
Appendix B in the supplemental data online.   
Dependent variables and variables of interest.  
We estimate equation (1) using three different dependent variables: per capita total expenditure (total 
expenditure), per capita current expenditure (current expenditure) and per capita capital expenditure 
(capital expenditure). We use these aggregate measures of expenditure and not those disaggregated by 
functions, because many municipalities (especially the small ones) have expenditure crossing more than 
one function, but often registered only in one function. 
To isolate the independent impact of neighboring expenditures on the expenditure of a given 
municipality, we use the neighbors’ expenditures variable (neigh expenditure). In order to obtain this 
variable we use a contiguity matrix, defining 𝜔𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑚𝑖 where 𝑚𝑖 is the number of municipalities 
contiguous to i and 𝜔𝑖𝑗 = 0 if municipalities are not contiguous. Hence, for each municipality i in period 
t, the average value of its own neighbors’ per capita expenditure is given by  𝑊𝐺−𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑡𝑗≠𝑖 . 
Control variables 
The municipality expenditure can be affected by other factors, accounting for demographic, socio-
economic and electoral characteristics. In particular, we include a set of time-varying variables, which 
characterizes the municipality’s demographic and economic situation. We include the municipal 
population (population*10-4) and per capita area (area*103) - square kilometers divided by population – 
as these variables can capture the presence of scale economies and/or congestion effects. The proportion 
of citizens aged between 0 and 5 (children*103) and the proportion of citizens aged over 65 (aged*103) 
can control for some specific public needs (e.g., nursery school, nursing homes for the elderly) and hence 
may influence the composition of the public spending. 
In terms of economic and financial controls, we include the per capita personal income tax base 
(income*10-3), i.e., a proxy of per capita average income, and per capita transfers (current, capital or total 
grants) from upper tiers of governments (transfers), that vary according to the dependent variable adopted 
in the estimation. These variables should have a positive impact on expenditure.x On the one side, higher 
levels of local expenditure might be associated with high level of local economic development (proxied 
by the per-capita personal income tax base) and, on the other side, an increase in the municipal revenue 
(proxied by transfers) should lead to an increase in expenditure. 
Furthermore, following the literature (Bordignon et al, 2003; Foucalut at al., 2008; Bartolini and 
Santolini, 2012) we use a set of political variables that may influence the local budget. In particular, we 
define a dummy variable (election), which, during the period 2001-2011, is equal to 1 for a given 
municipality in the year of election.xi The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive as the 
incumbent might have an incentive to expand the expenditure during the election period in order to be 
re-elected. We then measure the political power of the mayor by using the percentage of votes that have 
been necessary to win an election (vote-share): the stronger the power of the local policy maker, the 
greater is her capacity to influence the budget.  Since Italian law establishes a limit of no more than two 
consecutive terms in office for a mayor, we use a dummy variable (term-limit) which is equal to 1 for all 
the years a mayor is at her second term (and hence she cannot be re-elected) and it is equal to 0 when the 
mayor is at her first term: the impossibility of further re-election may significantly bias the budget-related 
decisions of a municipality. 
Since 2001xii, the Italian central government – in order to fulfill the obligations of the European Stability 
and Growth Pact – imposes to each municipality above 5,000 inhabitants the so-called Domestic Stability 
Pact. Depending on the year, it implies either a constrained municipal deficit or a threshold on the 
municipal expenditure. Hence, we include a dummy (domestic stability pact) equals to one if a 
municipality has to fulfill the Domestic Stability Pact (i.e., it has more than 5,000 inhabitants) and 0 
otherwise: this variable should lead to lower level of expenditure.  
As discussed in the previous section, the dynamic model we estimate includes the lagged endogenous 
dependent variable, 𝐺(𝑖𝑡−1) and two further endogenous variables, namely the average neighboring 
expenditure, WG−it, and per capita transfers (current, capital or total grants) from upper tiers of 
governments (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡). Therefore, all these variables are instrumented by using their lags
xiii. 
Results 
We first estimate equation (1) by using the OLS estimator (Table 1, col. 1), then we replicate the previous 
estimation by applying the FE estimator (Table 1, col. 2) and, finally, we perform the SYS-GMM 
estimator (Table 1, col. 3). 
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is found to be positive and always significant in all 
specifications, and thus suggesting a certain degree of inertia of public expenditure. In particular, the 
estimated coefficient of expenditure(-1) ranges between 0.25 and 0.50. These values are in line with the 
findings of Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Foucalut et al., (2008), although they are slightly lower with 
respect to those found by Bartolini and Santolini (2012) for the Italian region of Marche. 
Turning to the results associated with the presence of spending interactions, we find that the coefficient 
of neigh expenditure is always positive and significant in all specifications. This suggests the existence 
of a positive horizontal interdependence in the expenditure of Italian municipalities. In particular, looking 
at coefficient of the SYS-GMM (Table 1, col. 3), we find that a one-euro increase in the average 
expenditure of the neighbors generates, ceteris paribus, an increase in the expenditure of municipality i 
of 0.16 euro. In practice, public goods/services provided by neighbors’ municipalities are complements 
of the municipality’s own goods/services provision. 
In terms of the other control variables all the coefficients have the expected signs. Considering our 
preferred specification (SYS-GMM, col. 3), the coefficients of both transfers and income*10-3 are 
positive (0.38 and 17.93, respectively) and signficant, implying that total expenditure is higher for 
increasing levels of income and grants.  Municipalities’ geographic and demographic characteristics have 
also an effect on total expenditure. The positive coefficient of area*10-3 (4.31 and significant at 1%)  
suggests the presence of economies of scale, since the lower the municipal area per capita the higher the 
level of expenditure; while the postive coefficient found for population*10-4 (11.58 and statistically 
significant at 1%) accounts for the presence of congestion effects. Moreovoer, the municipal spending 
decreases as the proportion of children increase, being the coeffcient of children*103  negative (-2.02) 
and significant. 
All our specifications include political and institutional variables as well. Focusing on the SYS-GMM, 
the dummy variable election has a positive and significant coefficient (20.24), implying the presence of 
the political budget cycle, as the incumbent mayor has an incentive to expand the expenditure in order to 
be re-elected. In   addition, a higher level of expenditure is associated with a high value of vote-share 
(75.86), suggesting that mayors supported by a large counsensus have more power to influence the local 
budget. 
Finally, the dummy variable domestic stability pact shows a negative and significant coefficient (-38.08), 
confirming recent findings (Grembi et al., 2016) on the effectiveness of the Domestic Stability Pact in 
constraining local expenditures. 
Insert Table 1 here 
In Table 2 we report the results of the estimations using as dependent variable the two components of 
total expenditures: current expenditure (col. 1, 2 and 3) and capital expenditure (col. 4, 5 and 6). We 
apply OLS, FE and SYS-GMM estimators. In the latter case, as before, we instrument our lagged 
dependent variable and the other endogenous variables (neigh expenditure and transfers) with their lags. 
For current expenditure, looking at our preferred specification, SYS-GMM  (Table 2, col. 3), we find a 
certain degree of persistency in the lagged expenditure, however the effect is weakly significant and 
smaller (0.11) if compared to the one estimated for total expenditure. The coefficient associated with 
current expenditure of neighboring muncipalities (neigh expenditure) is positive (0.65), statistically 
significant at 1% and larger than the one estimated for total expenditure. Such a positive effect suggests 
that the interaction in current spending decisions at local level is driven by public goods and/or services 
of complement type.  
Moving to capital expenditure, the results – looking at SYS-GMM (Table 2, col. 6) - show that the 
estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive (0.31) and statistically significant at 
1%. It is also very similar to the one estimated for total expenditure (Table 1, col. 3), indicating that 
capital expenditure at municipal level in Italy is likely to change slowly over time. The coefficient of 
capital expenditure of neighboring municipalities (neigh expenditure) is positive (0.10), significant at 
5%, and lower than the one estimated for total expenditure. The positive coefficient associated to the 
neighboring expenditure reveals that spatial interactions on capital expenditure at the local level are 
driven by those investments that are complements in usage.  
Control variables are also very informative about the determinants of both current and capital municipal 
expenditure. In particular, the coefficient associated with population*10-4 is positive and significant and 
thus confirming the presence of congestion effects; the coefficient of per-capita area (area*103) is 
positive and statistically significant, implying the presence of economies of scale, and the coefficient of 
vote-share is positive and significant as we found for the total expenditure. On the contrary, the variable 
domestic stability pact, which captures financial constraints imposed by the central government to 
municipalities, is negative and significant both for current and capital expenditure. Moreover, for the 
specific case of current expenditure, the coefficient of aged*103 turns out to be positive and significant, 
indicating that a higher share of elderly people is associated with high level of current expenditure. On 
the side of capital expenditure, instead, the coefficients of transfers (0.47), income*10-3 (2.59) and 
election (-33.89) play an important role in explaining investment decisions at municipal level. 
Thus far, our empirical evidence leads to three main findings that can be summarized as follows. Firstly, 
local expenditure of Italian municipalities turned out to be persistent - especially for the case of capital 
expenditure -  and this result is in line with the evidence found for other countries, such as France 
(Foucault et al., 2008) and Portugal (Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Costa et al., 2015). Moreover, our results 
show the presence of a positive horizontal interdependence in spending decision among Italian 
municipalities, with the effect being more pronounced for current expenditure. A one-euro increase in 
the average current expenditure of the neighbors generates, ceteris paribus, an increase of 0.65 euro in 
the municipality’s current expenditure; whereas, a one-euro increase in the average capital expenditures 
of the neighbors generates, ceteris paribus, an increase of 0.10 euro in municipality’s capital expenditure. 
While the presence of horizontal interactions in current spending decisions is a well known result for 
Italian municipalities (Ermini and Santolini, 2011; Bartolini and Santolini, 2012), the findings of a 
positive interaction in capital expenditure – and thus of a complementarity relationship in the provision 
of local public goods – represent a novel result for the Italian case. Finally, political variables are 
important factors of municipal expenditure. In particular, the power of the mayor, in terms of political 
consensus, leads to higher expenditure – both current and capital. Being in an electoral year positively 
impacts only on capital expenditure, as spending on infrastructures is usually seen as the most visible 
ones (Drazen and Eslava, 2010). 
Insert Table 2 here 
 Robustness tests 
In order to cofirm the results found in the previous section, we run two sets of robustness tests. Firstly, 
we replicate the analysis using alternative weighting matrices. Then, we exploit a natural experiment and 
we compare the results obtained using an internal instrument to the results obtained with an external 
instrument. 
 
 Different weighting matrices  
As a initial set of robustness test, we re-estimate the previous models by using three different neighbor’s 
weighted  matrices. We, first, consider neighbors all municipalities distant up to 25 km from a given 
municipality and we weight the corresponding expenditure with the inverse of that distance; for distances 
above 25 km the weight is 0. Then, by using the same procedure, we classify as neighbors all 
municipalities whose distance from a given municipality is no more than 50 km and, finally, we use a 
broader definition of neighbors, namely we define neighbors all municiplaities whose distance is within 
100 km. 
We perform the estimations for the total expenditure and its two components (current expenditure and 
capital expenditure) using the three spatial matrices, separately. xiv 
What the results simply suggest is that although the estimated coefficients are found to be larger as the 
distance increasesxv, they are not stastically different between each other, leading us to conclude that the 
fiscal interaction effect is not statistically sensitive to the definition of “neighborhood”.  
To better illustrate these findings we plot the coefficients of the variable neigh expenditure and its 10% 
confidence interval, for each weighting matrix adopted (25, 50 and 100 km neighborhood) and for each 
dependent variable (total, current and capital expenditure). For example, in the case of current 
expenditure, we find that the neigh expenditure coefficient (0.77, statistically significant at 1%) obtained 
by using the definition of 25 km neighborhood (Table C1, col. 2) is not statistically different from the 
coefficient of neigh expenditure (0.88, and statistically significant at 1%) obtained by using the definition 
of 50 km neighborhood  (Table C1, col. 5). Indeed, looking at Figure 1, Panel B, their confidence intervals 
overlap, while, on the contrary, there is no overlapping with the coefficient of neigh expenditure obtained 
using the definition of 100 km neighborhood. The same picture emerges from both total expenditure 
(Figure 1, Panel A) and capital expenditure (Figure 1, Panel C). 
Figure 1: Point estimates and 10% confidence interval of the variable neigh expenditure for different specification of the 
municipal distance 
Insert Figure 1 
An experimental setting 
Recent studies (Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Lyytikäinen, 2012; Baskaran, 2014; Isen, 2014) have 
pointed out that, within the framework of spatial econometrics, the use of internal instruments does not 
offer a valid identification of causal effects, which, in turn, might lead to biased estimates. Consequently, 
they suggest following the quasi-experimental approach by exploiting exogenous variation in the 
neighbors dependent variable.  
 
In our case, as a source of exogenous variation in the municipal spending, we consider the severe 
earthquake that occurred in Abruzzo region in the year 2009xvi. In particular, during the period April-
October 2009, 49 municipalities (corresponding to approximately 15% of the total municipalities of 
Abruzzo region) were hit by the tremors that caused the collapse of houses, churches, schools, buildings 
and cracks of sidewalks and roadsxvii.  
 
We restrict our analysis to the Abruzzo’s municipalities observed between 2009 and 2010, and we test 
whether the change in the average expenditure of neighboring municipalities in the same period affects 
the change in the expenditure of a given municipality. We rewrite Eq. (1) in first differences, without 
considering the lagged value of the dependent variable: 
 
∆𝐺𝑖 = 𝛾∆ ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  + ∆𝑥𝑖𝜌 + 𝜀𝑖 ,   (2) 
 
where  ∆𝐺𝑖 is the change in per capita expenditure of a municipality i from 2009 to 2010, ∆ ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  
is the change, in the same period, in the average per capita expenditure of neighbouring municipalities. 
ωij are exogenously chosen, row-standardized, weights that give the value 1 to municipalities that share 
a border and 0 otherwise. ∆𝑥𝑖 is the change, from 2009 to 2010, of the explanatory variables described 
within the third sectionxviii, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.  
 
We deal with the endogeneity issues by employing and comparing two strategies. The first strategy 
consists in estimating Eq. (2) by instrumenting the endogenous variables using an internal instrument. 
Therefore, the change in the average per capita expenditure of neighbors, ∆ ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 , from 2009 to 
2010, is instrumented by using its lags, i.e., the change in the average per capita expenditure of neighbors 
from 2008 to 2009. The second strategy relies on the exogenous variation in the neighbors' expenditure 
induced by the natural disaster, which provides an “external” instrument. In particular, we define a 
dummy variable (Earthquake) equal to one if a municipality was hit by the earthquake in 2009 and zero 
otherwise. We then build a new variable, Earthquake intensity, given by the product of Earthquake and 
the Mercalli-Carcani-Sieberge (MSC) scale registered in each municipality hit by the earthquake. Finally 
we use the variable Earthquake intensity to build the variable WEarthquake intensity, measuring the 
intensity of the earthquake in the neighboring municipalities. The latter variable is then used to 
instrument the change in the average expenditure of neighbors' municipalities. 
 
In Table 3 we report the results for both the internal and the external instruments, for each type of 
expenditure. Focusing on the internal instrument, when we consider the total expenditure (col.1), the 
neigh expenditure coefficient is equal to 0.73, statistically significant at 10%. When we use the external 
instrument (col. 2) the estimated coefficient of neighboring muncipalities is positive and significant at 
5%, but lower (0.28),  suggesting that estimations carried out with the internal instrument might lead to 
upward biased estimates.xix For the case of current expenditure, we find that the results using internal 
instruments (Table 3, col. 3) are very similar to those obtained by employing external instruments (Table 
3, col. 4). Finally, for capital expenditure, we find that the coefficients are not statistically significant 
using both the internal (Table 3, col. 5) and the external (Table 3, col. 6) instruments, although they have 
the same (positive) signxx. 
Overall, our results reinforce the evidence of a positive horizontal interdependence in spending decision 
among Italian municipalities. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 Testing for sources of spatial interdependence 
The results discussed in the previous sections have assessed the presence of strategic interaction between 
spending decisions at the local level, however they have not revealed any source of such interdependence. 
Therefore, we now investigate whether the municipal interdependence is driven by yardstick competition 
and/or spillover effects.  
 
Yardstick competition hypothesis 
The hypothesis of yardstick competition assumes that voters do not have complete information on the 
type of policy maker, and they compare policies carried out in their municipality with those of nearby 
municipalities (Salmon, 1987). Then, starting from these insights, the empirical literature has linked 
fiscal interactions with the political process. In particular, fiscal interdependences might be effective in 
both electoral (Sollé-Ollé, 2003) and pre-electoral (Bartolini and Santolini, 2012) years, when politicians 
mimic the behavior of their neighbor’s to capture voters’ preferences and to win elections. This behavior 
is more pronounced when politicians are not lame duck, which implies that they are interested in 
obtaining voters’ confidence (Case, 1993; Bordignon et al., 2003), and it might depend further on the 
power of the policy maker, in terms of electoral consensus (Bordignon et al., 2003; Allers and Elhrost, 
2005).  
In order to test the existence of yardstick competition we interact the neighboring expenditure variable 
with the political variables, and we estimate the following model: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺(𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑊𝐺−𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝐺−𝑖𝑡) + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. (3) 
We separately estimate equation (3) by using SYS-GMM and allowing for four different specifications 
of political variables (i.e., electoral and pre-electoral years, political power of the mayor and mayors that, 
according to the Italian law, cannot be re-elected) and we test the robustness of our results by considering 
alternative weighting matrices based on geographical distance. We consider neighbors all municipalities 
distant up to i) 25 km and ii) 50 km, respectively. 
In the first specification we use the election year dummy (election) as a political variable. A positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction between spending decision and the electoral dummy would imply 
the presence of yardsdtick competition. However, the interaction term (neigh expenditure*election) is 
never statistically significant (Table 4) for any of our dependent variables and for any adopted weighting 
matrix (contiguity and geographical distance – 25 and 50 km).  
This result together with those obtained using other political variable, as well as results carried out using 
our experimental frameworkxxi, indicate that yardstick competition is not a source of spatial interaction, 
that is municipalities do not mimic each other to get votes and the spatial interdependence is not sensitive 
to the electoral cycle.  
Insert Table 4 here 
Spillover Hypothesis and the size of municipalities 
The absence of yardstick competition reveals that the source of spatial interactions in spending decisions 
among Italian municipalities is likely due to spillover effects. Therefore, we perform an additional test 
to verify whether the municipality size influences the spatial interdependence. The hypothesis is based 
on the recent findings of Ferraresi et al. (2017), who show – both theoretically and empirically – that the 
size of a municipality affects spatial spillovers. The rationale is that a highly populated municipality 
hardly reacts to changes in expenditure by a neighboring municipality, because spillover effects on its 
residents are negligible. 
In order to evaluate the size of the municipality, we estimate the following model that includes the 
interaction of the neighbor’s expenditure with the variable 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 10
−4: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺(𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑊𝐺−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆(𝑊𝐺−𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 10
−4) + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. (4) 
The estimate of the spatial spillover is given by 𝛾 +  𝜆*population*10-4, which depends on the size of 
the municipality. Equation (4) is estimated adopting a SYS-GMM estimator. We also test the robustness 
of our results by considering alternative weighting matrices based on geographical distance (25 and 50 
km, respectively). 
The results are reported in Table 5. Considering the total expenditure (col. 1), the estimated coefficient 
of the spatial spillover (γ +  λ*population), is positive and statistically significant for any level of 
population below 90,000 inhabitants. Turning to current expenditure, according to the estimated 
coefficients (Table 5, col. 2), it emerges that the spatial spillover is positive and significant only for 
municipalities with less than 50,000 inhabitants. As capital expenditure concerns (Table 5, col. 3), 
municipalities positively react to an increase in capital expenditure of neighboring communities as long 
as the level of population is lower than 85,000 inhabitants.  All results do not change when relying on 
our experimental framework (see Tables D6 and D7 of Appendix D in the supplemental data online). 
Our results suggest that the complementarity relationship in the provision of local public goods and 
services holds only for population levels below a given threshold. In fact, it is very likely that a highly 
populated municipality hardly reacts to changes in per capita expenditure of a small neighboring 
municipality. In terms of public goods spillovers, these changes have a negligible per capita impact on 
the residents of a large municipality.  
Insert Table 5 here 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored the existence of spatial interactions in spending decisions among Italian 
municipalities. We have estimated a spatial autoregressive dynamic panel data model, using data on 
5,564 Italian municipalities observed during the period 2001-2011 and exploiting their border contiguity. 
We have found a positive effect of neighbors’ expenditure on the expenditure of a given municipality, 
for total, capital and current expenditure, suggesting the presence of a complementarity relationship in 
the provision of local public goods 
Our results are robust to the use of different weighting matrices, and are confirmed by a quasi-
experimental approach.  Moreover, we did not find any evidence of yardstick competition, and we are 
confident that spillover effects drive the strategic interaction. This conclusion is further supported by the 
negative relationship between spatial interaction and municipality’s size, especially for current 
expenditures. A highly populated municipality should hardly react to changes in per capita expenditure 
of a small municipality, because public goods spillovers are negligible to the residents of large 
municipalities. 
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Table 1: Estimation results for total expenditure with OLS, FE and SYS-GMM estimator 
Dependent variable Total Expenditure 
Model OLS FE SYS-GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Expenditure (-1) 0.50*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Neigh expenditure 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.16* 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.10) 
Transfers 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.38*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.10) 
Population*10-4 6.09*** -189.54*** 11.58*** 
 
(0.85) (38.80) (1.79) 
Children*103 -1.41*** -1.07 -2.02*** 
 
(0.41) (0.77) (0.52) 
Aged*103 -0.31*** 0.10 0.23 
 
(0.11) (0.30) (0.24) 
Area*103 1.47*** 8.64*** 4.31*** 
 
(0.31) (3.28) (0.95) 
Income*10-3 21.45*** 33.30*** 17.93*** 
 
(1.29) (8.23) (3.86) 
Domestic stability pact -6.23 -73.39** -38.08*** 
 
(4.08) (29.09) (11.04) 
Election 11.66** 22.13*** 20.24*** 
 
(4.85) (3.92) (4.87) 
Term-limit 3.11 7.15* 3.03 
 
(3.99) (4.14) (3.96) 
Vote-share 4.32 21.43 75.86*** 
 
(15.82) (20.73) (28.11) 
Constant 104.70*** 17.20 181.99** 
 (36.37) (150.67) (73.11) 
 
   
Observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 
R-squared 0.84 0.46 
 










Number of instruments 
  
29 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are shown in parentheses. In all regressions we control 
for time fixed effects, while, in col. (2) and (3) we also include municipal fixed effects. In col. (3) the variable Expenditure (-1) is instrumented applying 
difference GMM, by using lags 1, 2 and 3; the variable neigh expenditure is instrumented applying SYS-GMM, by using lags 3 and 4; the variable transfers 
(total transfers) is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 3 and 4. The validity of the instruments is checked by using the standard Hansen test and 
the C test (results are available upon request).  
Table 2:  Estimation results for current and capital expenditures with the SYS-GMM estimator 
Dependent variable Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
Model OLS FE SYS-GMM OLS FE SYS-GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Expenditure (-1) 0.92*** 0.41*** 0.11* 0.37*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Neigh expenditure 0.06*** 0.27*** 0.65*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.10** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.18) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
Transfers 0.10*** 0.15*** -0.33 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.47*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
Population*10-4 1.33*** -94.36*** 22.70*** 2.51*** 14.79 2.27*** 
 
(0.42) (17.87) (3.33) (0.55) (20.13) (0.84) 
Children*103 -0.28*** -0.42*** -1.31*** -0.55 -0.30 -0.68* 
 
(0.08) (0.16) (0.46) (0.38) (0.68) (0.37) 
Aged*103 -0.05* -0.07 0.62** -0.10 0.48* 0.07 
 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.29) (0.10) (0.28) (0.09) 
Area*103 0.26*** 4.88*** 2.49*** 0.85*** 2.97 2.09*** 
 
(0.06) (0.80) (0.69) (0.25) (2.74) (0.36) 
Income*10-3 2.48*** 9.59*** -1.20 3.65*** 18.34** 2.59*** 
 
(0.60) (1.69) (5.46) (0.56) (7.67) (0.74) 
Domestic stability pact -2.71* -7.11** -43.26*** -23.07*** -55.88* -33.89*** 
 
(1.54) (3.55) (15.38) (3.20) (29.50) (4.68) 
Election -1.40 -0.46 -0.52 15.03*** 21.27*** 17.60*** 
 
(1.36) (1.16) (1.90) (4.22) (3.69) (4.07) 
Term-limit -0.22 0.57 -2.62 4.48 7.16* 3.40 
 
(1.09) (1.09) (2.60) (3.46) (3.92) (3.23) 
Vote-share 4.34 8.77* 56.46*** 21.82 16.44 51.61*** 
 
(3.87) (4.88) (19.54) (13.95) (20.07) (18.02) 




 (10.02) (40.29) (109.93) (32.19) (127.26) (33.19) 
 
      
Observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 

























Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are shown in parentheses. In all regressions we control 
for time fixed effects, while, in col. (2), (3), (5) and (6) we also include municipal fixed effects.  In col. (3) the variable Expenditure (-1) is instrumented applying 
difference GMM, by using lags 1, 2, 3 and 4; the variable neigh expenditure is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 7 and 8; the variable transfers 
(current transfers) is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lag 4. In col. (6) the variable Expenditure (-1) is instrumented applying difference GMM by 
using lags 1 and 2; the variable neigh expenditure is instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 2 and 3; the variable transfers (capital transfers) is 
instrumented applying SYS-GMM by using lags 3 and 4. The validity of the instruments is checked by using the standard Hansen test and the C tests (results 
are available upon request).  
 
 
Table 3 Second stage results for total, current and capital expenditure: internal vs external instrument.  
Dependent variable Total expenditure Current expenditure Capital expenditure 
Type of instrument Internal External Internal External Internal External 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Neigh expenditure (2010-2009) 0.73* 0.28** 0.17** 0.21** 8.35 0.38 
 
(0.41) (0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (29.86) (0.27) 
Earthquake intensity 96.61** 148.22*** -7.89 -10.72 -250.05 78.05*** 
 
(46.44) (35.23) (8.50) (10.34) (1,227.81) (23.86) 
Transfers (2010-2009) 0.09 0.08 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.10 -0.11 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.98) (0.07) 
Population (2010-2009) -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.29 0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.95) (0.03) 
Children (2010-2009) 8,853.37 -3,037.41 83.05 363.82 147,953.39 757.78 
 
(14,557.95) (11,478.13) (5,354.22) (5,046.00) (572,687.85) (11,980.09) 
Aged (2010-2009) 174.75 -1,057.48 -3,181.75* -3,176.26* 25,308.44 4,402.26 
 
(8,227.77) (7,654.80) (1,920.22) (1,924.80) (94,865.76) (7,182.92) 
Area (2010-2009) 35,015.25 46,267.37* 1,756.31 1,157.68 -44,963.74 28,670.93* 
 
(26,418.25) (26,090.25) (12,214.03) (12,327.24) (274,468.50) (14,831.34) 





(0.29) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) (6.28) (0.16) 
Domestic stability pact 98.11 28.77 16.83 19.90 566.07 8.37 
 
(72.52) (52.54) (21.67) (20.96) (2,158.98) (39.91) 
Election 197.04* 196.04* -16.58 -16.82 332.82 257.49** 
 
(115.58) (110.21) (37.93) (38.19) (839.85) (130.93) 
Term-limit 73.10 59.23 46.72** 46.48** 361.97 50.51 
 
(79.26) (75.98) (18.30) (18.45) (1,176.92) (72.66) 
Vote-share 112.45 91.53 104.53 104.89 261.83 -38.70 
 
(240.63) (266.08) (111.19) (109.61) (1,515.01) (222.39) 
Constant -212.33 -169.21 -78.47 -80.26 -437.54 -67.72 
 
(137.36) (147.56) (75.00) (74.63) (1,653.62) (108.65) 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 
R-squared 0.45 0.52 0.70 0.69 0.35 0.35 
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.36 76.593 34.973 56.366 0.062 32.25 
Notes: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 10%.Columns (1), (3) and (5) display the results by using internal instruments, namely the change in the average 
per capita expenditure of neighbors from 2008 to 2009. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the second stage results of the previous regressions by using the neighbor’s earthquake 
intensity variable as instruments for the change in the average expenditure of neighboring municipalities The spatial weight matrix (W) used is of the type: contiguity-based 





Table 4: Estimation results for yardstick competition model with the interaction between neigh expenditure and Election  
Weighting matrix Wcontiguity W25km W50km 
Dependent variable Total Current Capital Total Current Capital Total Current Capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Expenditure (-1) 0.33*** 0.10* 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.09* 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.07 0.32*** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Neigh expenditure 0.12* 0.62*** 0.11*** 0.25* 0.71*** 0.13* 0.23** 0.84*** 0.15* 
 
(0.07) (0.16) (0.04) (0.13) (0.16) (0.07) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09) 
Neigh expenditure * election 0.10 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.00 0.08 0.02 0.06 
 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) 
Transfers 0.33*** -0.27 0.46*** 0.32*** -0.11 0.44*** 0.19** -0.04 0.46*** 
 
(0.08) (0.20) (0.09) (0.10) (0.22) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.09) 
Election -100.58 -11.92 31.16* 90.00* -11.93 19.37 -77.19 -13.07 -11.90 
 
(75.23) (16.82) (18.46) (50.47) (18.85) (25.07) (60.61) (22.44) (33.93) 
Constant 236.41*** 120.28 90.13*** 28.62 50.46 78.28** 56.61 -61.95 -9.35 
 (62.06) (96.98) (32.77) (110.48) (133.16) (39.39) (105.99) (103.93) (40.66) 
Observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 
Number of municipalities 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
hansenp 0.341 0.315 0.919 0.510 0.153 0.428 0.28 0.138 0.397 
ar2p 0.777 0.646 0.757 0.841 0.694 0.803 0.689 0.537 0.806 
Number of instruments 31 30 31 31 30 31 34 31 31 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are shown in parentheses. We control for time and 
municipal fixed effects, population*10-4, children*103, aged*103, area*103, income*10-3, domestic stability pact, term-limit, vote-share. The variables 
Expenditure (-1), neigh expenditure, the interaction neigh expenditure * election and transfers are always instrumented using SYS-GMM, excluding for 
Expenditure (-1) in regression (2), (5) and (8), which is instrumented by using difference GMM. Instruments: (1) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-
1), lags 3 and 4 for the variables neigh expenditure, neigh expenditure*election and transfers (total transfers); (2) lags 1, 2 and 3 for the variable Expenditure 
(-1), lags 7 and 8 for the variable neigh expenditure, lags 5 and 6 for the variable neigh expenditure*election, and lag 4 for the variable transfers (current 
transfers); (3) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 2 and 3 for the variable neigh expenditure, lags 6 and 7 for the variable neigh 
expenditure*election, and lags 3 and 4 for the variable transfers (capital transfers); (4)  lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 4 and 5 for the 
variables neigh expenditure, neigh expenditure*election and transfers (total transfers); (5) lags 1, 2 and 3 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 7 and 8 for 
the variable neigh expenditure, lags 5 and 6 for the variable neigh expenditure*election, and lag 4 for the variable transfers (current transfers); (6) lags 1 and 
2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 2 and 3 for the variable neigh expenditure, lags 6 and 7 for the variable neigh expenditure*election, and lags 3 and 4 
for the variable transfers (capital transfers); (7)  lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 5, 6 and 7 for the variables neigh expenditure, lags  6, 7 
and 8 for the variables neigh expenditure*election and transfers (total transfers); (8) lags 1 and 3 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 7 and 8 for the variable 
neigh expenditure, lags 5 and 6 for the variable neigh expenditure*election, and lags 4 and 5 for the variable transfers (current transfers);  (9) lags 1 and 2 
for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 2 and 3 for the variable neigh expenditure, lags 6  and 7 for the variable neigh expenditure*election, and lags 3 and 4 
for the variable transfers (capital transfers). The validity of the instruments is checked by using the standard Hansen test and the C tests (results are available 





Table 5: Estimation results of the spending  interdependence and size of municipalities 
Weighting matrix Wcontiguity W25km W50km 
Dependent variable Total Current Capital Total Current Capital Total Current Capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Expenditure (-1) 0.45*** 0.08 0.43*** 0.46*** 0.06 0.43*** 0.86*** 0.12 0.40*** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.23) (0.08) (0.09) 
Neigh expenditure 0.45*** 0.66*** 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.82*** 0.54*** 0.67** 0.77*** 0.50*** 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) (0.16) (0.29) (0.14) (0.15) 
Neigh expenditure *( population*10-4) -0.02 -0.06* -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** -0.03 -0.10 -0.09*** -0.01 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) 
Transfers 0.12 -0.17 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.11 -0.13 -0.27 0.20 
 
(0.09) (0.22) (0.17) (0.08) (0.18) (0.17) (0.24) (0.20) (0.16) 
Population*10-4 37.64 63.11*** 8.95 34.11 75.52*** 12.86 118.86 81.11*** 3.76 
 
(24.02) (20.51) (9.40) (23.92) (14.66) (10.37) (102.05) (21.00) (7.58) 
Constant 14.46 70.96 0.90 -152.88 -83.74 -126.92** -485.19 -2.06 -154.43** 
 (102.81) (65.17) (47.36) (122.32) (62.32) (55.54) (340.89) (91.49) (62.50) 
Observations 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 55,640 
Number of municipalities 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 5,564 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
hansenp 0.214 0.525 0.479 0.637 0.138 0.375 0.865 0.166 0.316 
ar2p 0.636 0.834 0.488 0.498 0.358 0.581 0.987 0.828 0.667 
Number of instruments 31 31 32 31 31 31 28 30 33 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Robust standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, are shown in parentheses. We control for time and 
municipal fixed effects, children*103, aged*103, area*103, income*10-3, domestic stability pact, election, term-limit and vote-share. The variables Expenditure 
(-1), neigh expenditure, the interaction neigh expenditure*population*10-4 and transfers are always instrumented using SYS-GMM, excluding Expenditure (-
1) in regression (2), (5) and (8), which is instrumented using difference GMM. Instruments: (1) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 5 and 6 for 
the variable neigh expenditure, and lags 6 and 7 for the variables neigh expenditure*population*10-4  and transfers; (2) lags 1, 2 and 3 for the variable 
Expenditure (-1), lags 5 and 6 for the variables neigh expenditure and neigh expenditure*population*10-4, lags 4 and 5 for the variable transfers (current 
transfers); (3) lags 1, 2, 3 and 4 order lags for the variable Expenditure (-1), lag 5 for the variable neigh expenditure, and lags 6 and 7 for the variables neigh 
expenditure*population*10-4 and transfers (capital transfers); (4) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 5 and 6 for the variable neigh expenditure, 
and lags 6 and 7 for the variables neigh expenditure*population*10-4  and transfers; (5) lags 1, 2 and 3 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 5 and 6 for the 
variables neigh expenditure and neigh expenditure*population*10-4, lags 4 and 5 for the variable transfers (current transfers); (6) lags 1, 2, 3 and 4 order lags 
for the variable Expenditure (-1), lag 5 for the variable neigh expenditure, lag 2 for the variable neigh expenditure*population*10-4 and lags 6 and 7 for the 
variable transfers (capital transfers); (7) lag 3 for the variables Expenditure (-1) and neigh expenditure, lag 2 for tne variable variables neigh 
expenditure*population*10-4  and lags 2 and 3 for the variable transfers; (8) lags 1 and 2 for the variable Expenditure (-1), lags 8 and 9 for the variables neigh 
expenditure and neigh expenditure*population*10-4, lags 4 and 5 for the variable transfers (current transfers); (9) lags 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 order lags for the 
variable Expenditure (-1), lags 5 and 6 for the variable neigh expenditure, lag 2 for the variable neigh expenditure*population*10-4 and lags 6 and 7 for the 







i For a theoretical survey on horizontal strategic interactions see, for example, Wilson (1999), while for an empirical survey on fiscal 
strategic interactions see, among others, Brueckner (2003), Revelli (2005) and, more recently, Delgado et al. (2014). 
ii The role of political ideology has been found to be an important driver also at the country level, as shown by Cassette and Exbrayat (2009), 
who conduct an analysis on 27 European countries over the period 1995-2007 finding that ideology on tax interactions holds only for 
contiguous countries. 
iii The findings of Santolini (2008) are based on a cross-section of 246 municipalities belonging to the Marche region for the year 1994. In 
our case, since we focus on a panel data of all Italian municipalities over the period 2001-2011, testing for the presence of strategic 
interactions between municipalities having the same political affiliation turns out to be unfeasible. This because the large majority of votes 
at local level are casted in favour of “civic” list (liste civiche), for which it is not possible to associate any political colour. Indeed, as shown 
by Bracco et al. (2015), more than 65% of Italian municipalities cannot be classified as left, neither as right. Therefore, testing whether 
spatial interactions are driven by political ideology would imply to use a very small fraction of municipalities (large only)  – not even 
contiguous to each other – , which in turns would lead to less efficient and accurate estimates. 
iv Ermini and Santolini (2011) found a positive and significant spillover effect for current expenditure, while, Bartolini and Santolini (2012) 
found evidence of yardstick competition, when they control for both the domestic stability pact and pre-electoral years.  
v It is worth noting that our dataset includes 61,204 observations, making it the largest sample ever examined in applied work on strategic 
interactions in spending decisions at the local level. In fact, among those papers analyzing the existence of interactions related to public 
expenditure, Foucalut at al., (2008) use a panel dataset of 90 French municipalities over the period 1983-2002, leading to 1,710 observations; 
Bartolini and Santolini (2011) rely on a panel dataset of 246 Italian municipalities of Marche region during the period 1994-2003, for a total 
of 2,460 observations and Costa et al., (2015) use a panel dataset of 278 Portuguese municipalities for the period 1986-2006, summing up 
to 5,560 observations. 
vi In Italy there are five autonomous regions (Sicilia and Sardegna, which are insular territories, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige and 
Friuli Venezia Giulia, which are northern boundary territories) and two autonomous provinces (Trento and Bolzano). 
vii The system GMM estimator is described in details in Appendix A in the supplemental data online.  
viii Milano, Roma, Napoli, Torino, Bari, Firenze, Bologna, Genova, Venezia and Reggio Calabria. 
ix We did not consider municipalities with missing values in the dependent variables defined in the third section. 
x Transfers from upper level of government represent a significant part, appoximatley around 25%, of the Italian municipal financing system. 
There is a well-known literature on the effects of grants on public expenditure (for a recent survey see Inman, 2009) usually finding that 
grants can stimulate government expenditures more than monetary transfers to individuals of the same amount—the so-called flypaper 
effect. 
xi Since Italian municipalities have staggered times of elections it is feasible to include, simultaneously, a dummy variable for municipal 
election and annual fixed effects. In this way we can distinguish the effect of being in an electoral year from other fluctuations due to 
changes in macroeconomic conditions. 
xii See law 388/2000, article 53. 
xiii Information about lags used for instrumenting all endogenous variables are provided for each estimated specification.   
xiv Results of this analysis are reported and discussed more in depth in Appendix C in the supplemental data online. 
xv Similar results are found by Costa et al. (2015), who justify the increase in the size of the estimated coefficient by saying that “when 
allowing for a broader definition of neighborhood, a higher effect of neighbors’ expenditure is captured” (pag. 1451).   
xvi Details on the earthquake can be found in Appendix C in the supplemental data online. 
xvii In our dataset we have information on only 195 out of 305 municipalities belonging to Abruzzo region. However, within our sample, 
the share of municipalities hit by the tremors is 12% (22 municipalities on 195), a percentage that is very close to real percentage of 
municipalities affected by the earthquake on the total number of municipalities belonging to Abruzzo region (49 municipalities on 305). 
xviii Note that for our political variables, namely election, term-limit and vote-share we use the 2010 value expressed in levels, instead of 
taking the first difference as these variables are related to the political cycle and therefore they do not show the classical panel dimension. 
xix The first stage results are reported in Table C2 and indicate that both internal and external instruments have a positive and highly 
significant impact on the change of neighbors' expenditure, both for total (col. 1 and 2) and current expenditure (col. 3 and 4), thus indicating 
that they are good instruments. For the case of capital expenditure, instead, only the external instruments turns out to have a positive and 
highly significant impact (col. 6). 
xx A possible explanation of this result might be related to the fact that many big infrastructures, such as schools and hospitals, were 
completely destroyed in Abruzzo municipalities because of the earthquake occurrence. Clearly, while damages in infrastructures of small 
entity can be recovered in short time, say within a year, the process of recovering spending for severe damages, as those occurred in Abruzzo, 
usually takes several years. In our exercise, we only consider one-year variation in capital expenditure, which practically corresponds to the 
first year this figure is included in the local budget. Therefore, it is possible that the municipal reaction to neighbors’ capital spending takes 
place in the long run when most of the spending for the recovery occurs. 
xxi These analyses are presented in greater detail in Appendix D in the supplemental data online. In particular, the results using the political 
variables term-limit, pre-electoral year and vote-share are shown in Tables D1, D2 and D3, respectively. As it regards results when relying 
on our experimental setting, see Tables D4 and D5.  
 
                                                          
